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INTRODUCTION
Human dignity has a long history in philosophy, theology,
politics, and jurisprudence.1 Broadly speaking, there are important
distinctions to be drawn between classical, patristic, medieval,
reformed, liberal, and postmodern approaches to the concept.
In the development of ideas about human dignity, three key
questions have emerged. First, there is the question whether
dignity is an attribute of certain privileged classes of human
beings or an attribute of all human beings without distinction.
Second, there is the question whether human dignity is necessarily
associated with the possession or exhibition of certain virtues or
qualities of character. Third, there is the question of the extent to
which dignity is an attribute of human persons conceived as
autonomous and atomized individuals or as persons embedded in
an array of associations and communities.

* Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Queensland. I wish to express my
thanks to Frederick Gedicks, Joel Harrison, Christopher McCrudden, Mark Movsesian,
Andrea Pin, Scott Pryor, and Dmytro Vovk for their comments on an earlier version of this
paper. My thanks are also due to Father Anastasios Bozikis and John Lee for assistance with
Greek texts.
1. See generally DIGNITY: A HISTORY (Remy Debes ed., 2017).
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This article will explore the implications of classical, patristic,
medieval, reformed, liberal, and postmodern approaches for the
concept of human dignity in respect of each of these three
questions. It will do so by focusing on the views of an array of
authors, including Marcus Tullius Cicero, Gregory of Nyssa,
Leo the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, Thomas Aquinas, Pico della
Mirandola, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Johannes Althusius,
Pope Paul VI, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Nietzsche. It will be
argued that while the older classical conception of dignity
understood it to be an attribute that distinguished some classes or
groups of human beings from others, the idea was transformed
under the influence of Stoic philosophy and especially Christian
theology into an attribute possessed by all human beings by virtue
of their created nature. In the patristic, medieval, and reformed
perspectives, human dignity was understood to be an attribute of
all human persons, conceived not as autonomous and atomized
individuals, but as embedded in a great variety of associations and
communities. As a consequence, dignity was considered to be
something that can never be separated from one’s moral
responsibilities as a human being called upon to perform the duties
associated with one’s particular calling and station in life.
In modern liberal conceptions of human dignity, however, the idea
became disassociated from the qualities of one’s character and from
the associations and communities in which human beings are
naturally embedded. Defining human dignity solely in terms of
human freedom and autonomy has resulted in a hollowing,
flattening and atomizing of human dignity, culminating in the
postmodern thought of Friedrich Nietzsche in which human
dignity is reduced to the “will to power,” a condition in which
“man in himself . . . possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor
duties.”2 This “rise and fall” of human dignity gives rise to the
question whether it can survive the ongoing processes of
hollowing, flattening, and atomizing that characterize late
liberalism and post-modernity, and under what conditions it might
be sustained.

2. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Greek State—Preface (1871), reprinted in POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: AN EDITED ANTHOLOGY 45 (Frank Cameron & Don
Dombowsky eds., 2008).
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I.

CLASSICAL DIGNITY

In a study of ancient Greek attitudes to human worth and value
as disclosed in the Homeric epics, especially the Iliad and the
Odyssey, Patrice Rankine has observed:
Homeric Greeks engaged in ruthless war and acts of pillage, and
at times mundanely bought and sold persons at a price, as
slaves. . . . [N]owhere do the epics offer anything like explicit,
formal criteria of human worth that could be aligned easily to our
contemporary western notion of dignity. Homeric epics do not
speak explicitly of an inherent or unearned moral status, which
status all humans share equally, and which is supposed to ground
fundamental human rights or protections.3

For these reasons Rankine argues that the most that might be
said of the Homeric epics is that they describe a set of practices that
“can be understood as precursors” to the later development of a
formal concept of human dignity.4 In the Iliad and Odyssey, the axios
(worth, value) of human beings varies: it is contingent and
comparative, not intrinsic; and it is closely related to the prowess
and fame of a mighty warrior like Hector or Achilles.5 For this
reason, axios later became associated with a person’s rank or status
in society and was used in a manner that resembled the term dignitas
in classical Rome.6
In Latin usage, the concept of dignitas was closely associated
with a person’s social standing and with the duties that particularly
pertained to that status. In the prevailing Roman view, “[h]uman
beings . . . do not have an automatic and inalienable dignity. Nature
gives them a role to play, and they must strive to play that role.”7
Dignity therefore meant “worthiness,” the respect or honor due to
3. Patrice Rankine, Dignity in Homer and Classical Greece, in DIGNITY: A HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 20 .
4. Id.
5. Id. at 22–23. Rankine argues that the encounter between Priam and Achilles (Iliad,
XXIV.477–84) discloses a certain regard for the common human dignity of the other.
However, his argument downplays the special heroic status of both characters compared
with the many other ‘lesser’ human beings in Homer’s narrative. While Achilles’ desecration
of Hector’s body is portrayed as an extreme breach of propriety, this is because Hector is
Troy’s preeminent warrior. As Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the martial virtue of
courage is the cardinal virtue in the Homeric epics. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 110 (3d ed. 2007).
6. Rankine, supra note 3, at 23–24.
7. Miriam Griffin, Dignity in Roman and Stoic Thought, in DIGNITY: A HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 47, 55 (emphasis omitted).
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someone on account of their office or rank.8 Moreover, dignity was
an attribute that attached, not only to individuals in their particular
duties and offices but also to entire groups and classes. As Miriam
Griffin explains, “[t]he dignitas of a gens implie[d] [a] family’s
superiority over other families,” just as ‘[t]he dignitas of the
equestrian order implie[d] its superiority over the rest of the
citizenry,” and “[t]he dignitas of the Roman people implie[d] its
superiority over other peoples.”9 Dignitas was therefore an
inherently comparative status. The treatment to which a person
was entitled depended on that person’s social standing. Honors
were distributed, freedoms conferred, and punishments executed
in a manner that was proportionate to a person’s rank within
society. Moreover, each person was expected to live up to that
social status or lose the marks of respect that went with it. Human
dignity was more about the privileges and duties associated with a
particular position in society than it was about the rights inhering
in all human beings.
There were, however, some exceptional Roman writers who
came close to affirming a universal dignity possessed by all human
beings. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), for example, considered
that it was unworthy of the superior qualities of human nature
(dignam hominis praestantia) for human beings to be controlled, like
brute animals, by desires for sensual gratification.10 Cicero’s
argument was premised on the qualities of excellence and dignity
(natura excellentia et dignitas) which he attributed, it seems, to all
human beings.11 However, he also noted that some human beings
are so controlled by their desires that they live like beasts, while
others conceal their appetite for such pleasures so as to avoid the
shame.12 For Cicero, like Seneca, dignitas was thus still conceived as
a “sliding scale of worthiness,”13 in which there ought to be a
“proportion between persons and their dignities.”14 There were
8. Hubert Cancik, ‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks
on Cicero, De Officus I 105–107, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE 19 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) .
9. Griffin, supra note 7, at 50.
10. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES], at IXXX.106, at 108–09 (Walter
Miller trans., 1913).
11. But see Kyle Harper, Christianity and the Roots of Human Dignity in Late Antiquity, in
CHRISTIANITY AND FREEDOM 127–28 (Timothy Shah & Allen Hertzke eds., 2016).
12. CICERO, supra note 10, IXXX.105, at 106–07.
13. Harper, supra note 11, at 129.
14. Harper, supra note 11, at 129.
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special dignities, inhering in certain offices, which ought also to be
recognized and preserved. Thus, it was the special office of the
magistrate to represent the state, to uphold its honor and dignity,
to enforce the law and to dispense to all their rights, remembering
that this was committed to him as a sacred trust.15 For Cicero, the
individual is situated within a system of many concentric circles
consisting of families, kinship groups, neighborhoods, cities,
nations, allies, and the human race as a whole (totius complexu gentis
humanae).16 Although, on this view, there was an important sense
in which every individual could be regarded as “a citizen of the
whole universe, as it were of a single city,”17 Cicero’s concern was
to emphasize the moral duties that attach to one’s place in the
world, alongside the rights to which one is entitled. Within the
Roman imperium many of the privileges of citizenship were, over
time, being extended to formerly subject peoples, but only full
Roman citizens have political rights.18
II.

PATRISTIC DIGNITY

There was a sense in which Cicero’s conception of cosmopolitan
citizenship remained abstracted from local political realities. His
conception of humanity was universal in theory, but the conditions
of his time, and his own views about citizenship, prevented its
political realization.19 The principle of the universal dignity of all
human beings could not be brought to bear on the particular civic
identity of each person, for there was no political community which
was understood to be intrinsically cosmopolitan.20 John Milbank
has argued that a universal yet concrete polity of this kind only
came into being with the advent of the Church.21 In his account, the
Church represented a kind of “alternative polity” (ecclesia) that was
15. CICERO, supra note 10, I.XXXIV.124, at 126–27.
16. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM [ON ENDS], at
V.XXII.65, at 466–69 (H. Rackham trans., 1914); see also CICERO, supra note 10, I.XVI.50–
I.XVII.55, at 52–59 & III.XVII.69, at 338–41.
17. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS [ON THE LAWS], at I.XXIII.61, at 366–67
(Clinton W. Keyes trans., 1928).
18. Filippo Carlà-Uhink, Alteram Loci Patriam, Aalteram Iuris: “Double Fatherlands” and
the Role of Italy in Cicero’s Political Discourse, in CITIZENS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD 259
(Lucia Cecchet & Anna Busetto eds., 2017).
19. See id. at 266, 272–73, 278.
20. John Milbank, Dignity Rather than Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 189,
198 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
21. Id. at 199.
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both concrete and universal in the sense that its citizenship was
open to all human beings without any distinction on the basis of
nationality, language, status, or sex.
This did not mean that human dignity came to be conceived
only as an abstract property possessed equally by all. The biblical
teaching that all human beings are made in the image and likeness
of God22 became a mainstay of Christian reflection on human nature,
but this was framed within the doctrines of creation, fall, and
redemption. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–95), in his treatise On the
Making of Man, taught that human beings are created in the likeness
of “the King of all,” and are therefore made to exercise beneficent
rule over the creation: “clothed in virtue,” “decked with the crown
of righteousness,” and bearing the “dignity of royalty” (τῆϛ
βασιλείαϛ ἀξιώματι).23 This dignity, he taught, applies to “all
mankind” for all “equally bear in themselves the Divine image.”24
Indeed, everything has dignity by virtue of its creation by God,
“from the angels in heaven . . . to the lowest earthly things.”25 And
yet, there is a “difference of dignity” as between men and animals
indicated by the upright bearing in which human beings stand
erect.26 In human beings, the Divine image is in the human nous, the
rational faculty that enables human beings to be self-determining
creatures that possess the dignity of personhood.27 This did not
mean that dignity was the preserve only of the wise or learned.
Gregory was very clear that the poor, no matter how abject their
poverty, are worthy of the respect and dignity due to them as
creatures bearing the imago Dei.28 For “[w]e are all of the same stock,
all brothers and sisters.”29 As a consequence of the fall from the
state of innocence, however, Gregory taught that the divine image
has been distorted and can only be fully restored by being remade
22. Genesis 1:27.
23. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Making of Man, in 5 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS
OF THE CHURCH, SECOND SERIES, at IV.1 (H.A. Wilson trans., Philip Schaff & Henry Wace
eds., 1893).
24. Id. at XVI.16–17.
25. Bonnie Kent, In the Image of God: Human Dignity after the Fall, in DIGNITY: A
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 78.
26. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 23, VIII.1.
27. Vladimir Lossky, The Theological Notion of the Human Person, in IN THE IMAGE AND
LIKENESS OF GOD 119–20 (1974).
28. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Love of the Poor, in WEALTH AND POVERTY IN EARLY
CHRISTIANITY 71, 73 (Helen Rhee ed., 2017).
29. Id. at 74.
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by the grace of God into the likeness of Christ. This restoration of
the “grace of the image” intrinsically involves a restoration of the
“dignity of rule” (τῆϛ ἀρχῆϛ ἀξία).30 Thus, the work of Christ
provides a double reason for human dignity, even for the most
poor, for Christ has given himself for the sake of even the very
poorest of His brethren, and they have, so to speak, “taken upon
themselves” the person of their Savior.31
In the Latin usage of late antiquity, dignitas continued to be a
term that could designate the status or standing of those who held
specific stations in life, and it could also be used in respect of entire
institutions, such as the Church itself. Consistent with this usage,
Pope Leo I (c. 400–61) wrote of the dignity which God has given
both to the churches and their priests,32 and recognized ranks of
dignity among the priesthood, distinguishing, for example, the
“grade of deacon” (diaconi gradum), the “honor of the presbytery”
(presbyterii honorem), and the “the highest rank of the bishopric”
(episcopatus culmen ascendat).33 However, like Gregory of Nyssa, he
also associated dignity with the creation of human beings in the
image of God. For Leo, “our race attains its highest natural dignity”
(naturalem nostri generis dignitatem) when the “form of the Divine
goodness” is reflected in us.34 Leo’s focus here was on the privileges
available to all through the grace of God in Christ and the dignity
that can be realized through partnership in the Divine nature.35
At their creation, human beings possessed the “high dignity” of
being created in the image of God in “goodness and
righteousness.”36 So, likewise, the “chosen and royal race” of those
saved by God in Christ “must live up to the dignity of [their]
regeneration.”37 And to do this, the spirit must overcome the flesh,

30. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 23, XXI.4, at 36.
31. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 28, at 73.
32. LEO I, Letter X, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, at II, at 9 (Henry Wace & Philip Schaff eds., 1895).
33. LEO I, Letter XII, in id. III, at 13; Sancti Leonis Magni Romani Pontificis Epistolae,
reprinted in PATROLOGIA LATINA 581 (Jacques-Paul Migne ed., 1846).
34. LEO I, Sermon XII, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, supra note 32, I, at 121; Sancti Leonis Magni Pontificis Romani Sermones, reprinted in
54 PATROLOGIAE LATINAE 138 (Jacques-Paul Migne ed., 1881).
35. LEO I, Sermon XXI, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, supra note 32, II, at 129.
36. LEO I, Sermon XXIV, in id. II, at 135.
37. LEO I, Sermon XXVI, in id. III, at 138.
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thereby upholding the “dignity of its rule” over the body.38 As Leo
put it in one of his sermons: “Awake, O man, and recognize the
dignity of your nature. Recollect [you were] made in the image
of God, which although it was corrupted in Adam, was yet
re-fashioned in Christ.”39 For Leo, human dignity derives from the
dignity of God, an attribute possessed equally by the three persons
of the Holy Trinity.40 Human nature has a dignity that exceeds that
of all the “heavenly creatures,” for it has been united with the
Divine nature in the person of the Son of God and is therefore
associated with the Eternal Father “on the throne with His glory.”41
All human beings share, in principle, in this “uplifting” of human
nature through its union with God through the “Incarnation of
the Word.”42
III. MEDIEVAL DIGNITY
In medieval jurisprudence the term dignitas developed an
increasingly technical meaning in which it designated a quality that
attached to high offices such as king and duke, pope and bishop.43
But while many medieval works discussed “the dignity of God or
Christ, the angels, Christ’s followers, or kings, bishops, priests, and
other people with special offices,” several important texts also
expanded on the dignity that all human beings have because they
are created in the Divine image.44 In his treatise On Loving God,
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) understood dignity, alongside
knowledge and virtue, to be the first of the three attributes of our
“higher nature,” the quality that distinguishes human beings from
non-sentient animals.45 Dignity, for Bernard, is intrinsically
associated with free-will (liberum arbitrium), the attribute by which
human beings excel all other earthly creatures and the reason why
they have dominion over them. Knowledge involves a two-fold

38. LEO I, Sermon XLII, in id. II, at 156.
39. LEO I, Sermon XXVII, in id. VI, at 141; see also Kent, supra note 25.
40. LEO I, Sermon LXXII, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, supra note 32, V, at 185.
41. LEO I, Sermon LXXIII, in id. III, at 187.
42. LEO I, Sermon LXXVII, in id. V, at 193.
43. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 383–450 (1957).
44. Kent, supra note 25, at 73–74.
45. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, ON LOVING GOD, ch. II, at 4 (n.d.), https://ccel.org/ccel/
bernard/loving_god/loving_god (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
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capacity: to recognize the dignity possessed by all human beings
and to understand that it is essentially a gift rather than an
accomplishment. Virtue, in turn, is the quality that impels human
beings to seek for and adhere to the Divine source and author of
these good gifts. Bernard emphasized that all three qualities are of
vital importance. Dignity, although a “peculiar eminence”
naturally enjoyed by all human beings, is worthless without
knowledge, and harmful without virtue.46 When men lack wisdom,
they are prone to two errors, he said. The first leads them captive
to merely sensual things and makes them comparable to irrational
beasts. The second causes them to glory in their dignity, forgetting
that it is a gift given to them by God, thereby usurping the glory
that is due to Him alone. For this reason, Bernard stressed the
importance of adding virtue to dignity and knowledge. He put it
this way:
Who is so impious as to attribute the peculiar eminence of
humanity to any other except to Him who saith, in Genesis, ‘Let
us make man in Our image, after Our likeness’? (Gen. 1.26). Who
else could be the Bestower of wisdom, but He that teacheth man
knowledge? (Ps. 94.10). Who else could bestow virtue except the
Lord of virtue? Therefore even the infidel who knows not Christ
but does at least know himself, is bound to love God for God’s
own sake. He is unpardonable if he does not love the Lord his God
with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his mind;
for his own innate justice and common sense cry out from within
that he is bound wholly to love God, from whom he has received
all things.47

Here Bernard gave expression to the prevailing medieval
understanding of the imago Dei as involving both intellectual
capacities and moral dispositions. All people have the inner
knowledge that they are bound wholly to love God, but achieving
this is difficult to the point of impossibility for any man to achieve
“by his own strength” and through “the power of [his] free-will.”48
The fall has disordered our natural dispositions and capacities, and
they can only fully be restored by the grace of God.
Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) took these themes further. Like
Bernard, he considered the image of God to consist in our creation

46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 5–6.
48. Id. at 5.
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as intelligent beings endowed with free will and self-movement.49
This capacity, on his view, is simultaneously a faculty of reason and
a faculty of will that is properly directed towards truth, goodness
and, ultimately, beatitude. Following Peter Lombard (1096-1160),
he considered all human beings to be gifted with the “faculty of
reason and will, through which good is chosen with grace assisting,
or evil with grace desisting.”50 This faculty is accordingly also “a
power, progressively formed in us, to produce moral acts of
excellence.”51 Bad choices are not fully acts of freedom, for they
involve a kind of bondage to sensual cravings rather than decisions
directed by reason and oriented to that which is truly good.
Many of the hundreds of Aquinas’s references to dignitas in his
works reflect the diverse senses of the term derived from general
classical and medieval usage.52 His most consequential discussion
of the matter appeared, however, in his consideration of what it
means to be a “person,” especially in relation to the Christian
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.53 Following Boethius,
Aquinas defined “person” as an “individual substance of a rational
nature.”54 Noting that the term persona had been used to designate
the theatrical portrayal of prominent city dignitaries, he argued it
was therefore fitting to use the term to designate the divine persons
of the Trinity. Observing that “subsistence in a rational nature” is a

49. As Servais Pinckaers points out, Aquinas’s discussion of the image of God was
positioned at the pivotal point in the Summa Theologiae where he turned from theology to
anthropology. See Servais Pinckaers, Ethics and the Image of God, in THE PINCKAERS READER:
RENEWING THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY 130, 132–33 (John Berkman & Craig Steven Titus
eds., 2005); see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II. Prologue, at 609 (Burns, Oates
& Washbourne trans., 1947–48, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 1990) (1485) (“Since, as
Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii, 12), man is said to be made to God’s image, in so far as
the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free will and self-movement, now that
we have treated of the exemplar, that is, of God, and of those things which came forth from
the power of God in accordance with His will, it remains for us to treat of His image, that is,
man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free will and control of his
actions.”) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE]; THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II.
Prologue (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans., 1947–48) (1485) [hereinafter SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.)].
50. Pinckaers, supra note 49, at 137 (quoting Peter Lombard, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI
QUATTUOR 452 (1971)).
51. Id. at 138.
52. See Servais Pinckaers, Aquinas on the Dignity of the Human Person, in THE PINCKAERS
READER: RENEWING THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY, supra note 49, at 144, 146.
53. For a discussion of its earlier use, see Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Concerning the
Notion of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO: INT’L CATHOLIC REV. 439 (1990).
54. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, I.29.1, at 25.
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status “of high dignity,” Aquinas considered that the same honor
of personhood should be extended to every individual who
possesses a rational nature.55 As Servais Pinckaers has observed,
this enabled Aquinas to continue to use the term dignitas to
designate the high personages of medieval civil and ecclesiastical
society, but also to use the term persona to designate every human
being, since everyone possesses the dignity of human nature.56 As
a consequence, all human beings were considered to have dignitas
in this basic sense, but they may become more dignified to the
extent that they better come to resemble the divine personality.57
According to Aquinas, it was due to both its dignity and its
fallenness that human nature was a fitting candidate for union with
the divine nature in the Incarnation.58 The dignity of human nature
consists in its rationality and its capacity to know and love God,
whereas the fallenness of human nature consists in its defection
from the Divine image in which it has been created. It followed for
Aquinas that the union of human nature with the divine nature
elevated it to an even higher dignity than could be secured if
humanity were conceived merely in itself, let alone in its fallen
state, without any relationship to God. Thus, Aquinas observed
that one of the lessons of the Incarnation is “how great is man’s
dignity, lest we should sully it by sin.”59
In this way the whole point of human dignity was, for Aquinas,
entirely moral and theological. As Pinckaers has pointed out, the
result was a threefold conception: first, the basic and ineradicable
dignity possessed by all human beings due to their rational
capacity to know and love God; second, the inherent potential for
growth and development in virtue through the course of a life lived
under the influence of divine grace; and third, the perfect
knowledge and love of God that may be secured in the heavenly
beatitude, the ultimate human destiny.60 In this theological context,
while sin can never destroy the inherent dignity of the human
person, it does diminish our natural inclinations to virtue, truth,
and goodness, and therefore causes us to “fall away” from our
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. I.29.3, at 33.
Pinckaers, supra note 52, at 151.
Id. at 152.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, III.4.1, at 72.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 49, III.1.2, at 704; see also THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, at IV.54 (Joseph Rickaby ed. & trans., 1905).
60. Pinckaers, supra note 52, at 158.
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original created dignity, and to “fall into” the “slavish state of
the beasts.”61 Sinful human beings are therefore deserving of
punishment for their sins, not because they have become irrational
animals in their essential nature, but because they have the high
dignity of human nature and therefore possess the capacity to
choose between good and evil. Given the extraordinary powers of
human beings to use their rational capacities rightly or wrongly,
Aquinas’s observation was blunt and to the point: “a bad man is
worse than a beast, and is more harmful.”62
A significant difference in tone, framing, and orientation
characterizes the so-called Oration on Human Dignity written by the
Italian Renaissance philosopher Pico della Mirandola (1463–94).
For Pico, the dignity of man consists in his status as a “creature of
indeterminate image” (opus indiscretae imaginis).63 This means that,
unlike all other creatures, human beings determine their own
natures acording to their own free will, mimicking the creative
freedom of God, fashioning themselves into whatever form they
individually prefer.64 The divine creation was thus central to Pico’s
conception of human dignity, but he drew substantially not only on
the account of the creation in the book of Genesis but on Plato’s
Symposium and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s De mystica
theologia.65 Man is a creature who is “permitted to obtain what he
desires and to be what he wills.”66 What he ought to pursue is the
highest “dignity and glory” of the angelic beings,67 first by curbing
the passions and cleansing the soul of ignorance and vice, and then
by imbuing the purified soul with the light of natural philosophy,
so that it may be ready to be perfected with the knowledge of things
Divine.68 For man’s mystical calling is to realize the full potentiality
of his nature through moral transformation, intellectual study, and
final perfection through identification with the Divine, a state of

61. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, II.II.64.2,
at 199.
62. Id.; see J. BUDZISZEWSKI, COMPANION TO THE COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S
TREATISE ON LAW 160–66 (2014).
63. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN: A NEW
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 53 (Francesco Borghesi et al. eds. & trans., 2012).
64. Id. at 70; Francesco Borghesi, Interpretations, in id. at 53–54.
65. Francesco Borghesi & Massimo Riva, Overview of the Text, in id. 67–69.
66. Id. § 24, at 119.
67. Id. § 49, at 135
68. Id. §§ 71–72, at 143.
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being which transcends all images and representations.69 However,
human freedom is such that human beings may choose not to
ascend to such heights, degenerating into a lower, brutish form of
life.70 The question is what path each human being will choose:
a barely sentient life analogous to that of plants and animals, or the
higher intellectual and contemplative life of angelic beings. Pico
concludes: “Who, then, will not admire man?”71
IV. PROTESTANT DIGNITY
Protestant theologians and jurists built on patristic and medieval
ideas about human nature and human dignity, but developed them
in directions that reflected several distinctive doctrines of the
Reformation.72 Martin Luther (1483–1546) in particular highlighted
the egalitarian and liberating dimensions of the concept of human
dignity. In his Freedom of the Christian Man (1520),73 he taught that
Christ imparts to every believer the dual dignities of kingship and
priesthood, understood not in a corporeal sense of exercising
temporal or coercive power, but in a spiritual sense of enabling
Christians to live in freedom from fear of death or persecution, and
in having direct and personal access to God in Christ.74 The “honor
and dignity” (Ehre und Würde), indeed “very high and honorable
dignity” (sehr hohe, ehrenvolle Würde), attached to these offices,75
makes every Christian simultaneously “the most free lord of all,
and subject to none” and “the most dutiful servant of all, and
subject to every one.”76 All Christians, regardless of their status in
society, enjoy the same essential freedom in Christ. As John Witte
has pointed out, this proposition could be taken to imply a far69.
70.
71.
72.

Francesco Borghesi, Interpretations, in id. 59–60.
Id. § 23, at 117.
Id. § 41, at 133.
See generally JOHN WITTE, LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE
LUTHERAN REFORMATION (2002) (investigating the relationship between the law and religious
doctrine in Luther’s Germany); JOHN WITTE, THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007) [hereinafter WITTE, REFORMATION OF
RIGHTS] (tracing Calvinism’s influence on Western law in early modern Europe).
73. Martin Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, in JOHN MURRAY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
THE REFORMATION 104 (Henry Wace & C.A. Buckheim eds., 1885) (1520) [hereinafter Luther,
Concerning Christian Liberty].
74. Id. at 115.
75. Id.; MARTIN LUTHER, VON DER FREIHEIT EINES CHRISTENMENSCHEN § 15
(Wittenberg, Johann Rhau-Grunenberg 1520), http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/urn/
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-473882 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
76. Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, supra note 73, at 104.
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reaching egalitarianism, for it suggests that “a lowly Augustinian
monk from an obscure German town [might] address His Holiness
Leo X as if he were the pope’s equal.”77 While Luther in his later
writings resisted some of the more radical implications of this idea
in his responses to the excesses of the Peasants’ Revolt (1525),
as well as the antinomian experiments of some Anabaptist groups,
these ideas made many Protestants fervent believers in the
proposition that by faith the Christian believer is “free from all law,
and in perfect freedom does gratuitously all that he does . . . which
is well-pleasing to God.”78
At the same time, while Protestant theologians continued to
understand human dignity to be grounded in the creation of all
human beings in the Divine image, they tended to place more
emphasis on the fallenness of human nature and its dependence on
divine grace for its restoration than their Catholic counterparts.
John Calvin (1509–64), for example, certainly affirmed the
“primeval dignity” 79 and “original excellence and nobility” 80 given
to human beings at their creation, but he also reflected on the “sad
spectacle of our ignominy and corruption.”81 The “hereditary
corruption and depravity of [human] nature,” which Calvin,
following Augustine, called “original sin,” characterizes all human
beings without distinction.82 Calvin taught that due consideration
of our fallen state should humble us and inspire us with “new
desires to seek after God, in whom each may regain those good
qualities of which all are found to be utterly destitute,” and thereby
be “raised to royal dignity.”83 Like many theologians before him,
Calvin understood the “highest perfection of dignity” to subsist in
77. John Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Early Protestant
Perspective, in IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMES 119 (Robert P. Kraynak
& Glenn Tinder eds., 2003) [hereinafter Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity].
78. Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, supra note 73, at 122.
79. JOHN CALVIN, THE INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, at II.I.3, at 212 (Henry
Beveridge trans., Christian Classics Ethereal Library (c. 2007)) (1536), [hereinafter CALVIN,
INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.)], https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html.
80. JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, at II.VI.1, at 340 (Ford Lewis
Battles trans., Westminster Press 1960) (1536).
81. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, II.I.1, at 210.
82. Id. II.I.8, at 217. As the Catholic publicist G.K. Chesterton (no friend of Calvin) once
quipped, original sin is not a doctrine of the superiority of one category of human being over
another; rather, it encourages a sense of “pathos and brotherhood, and a thunder of laughter
and pity; for only with original sin we can at once pity the beggar and distrust the king.”
GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 292 (1909).
83. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, II.I.3, at 211 & II.VII.1, at 301.
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our union with God,84 recalling the creation of man as the
“preeminent specimen of Divine wisdom, justice, and goodness.”85
He also taught that it is the “beauty and dignity” of the Divine
image in human beings that motivates us to treat others with justice
and forbearance.86
John Witte has argued that this belief in the equal dignity of all
Christian believers was an important impetus for later Protestant
jurists to translate the moral duties owed by all human beings to
one another into the correlative rights of every human person.87
Thus, the commands contained in the Decalogue that we must not
kill, commit adultery, steal, or bear false witness against our
neighbor88 were translated into the corresponding rights of our
neighbor to life, property, fidelity, and reputation.89 One example
of this tendency is seen in the work of the Calvinist jurist
Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), who understood adherence to the
correlative duties and rights of the Decalogue to be a matter of
human dignity.
Like many Protestant jurists, Althusius considered the Ten
Commandments to set forth the organizing principles of the ideal
Reformed Christian polity.90 Following traditional exegesis, he
distinguished between the “First Table” of the Decalogue as
containing the duties human beings owe to God and the “Second
Table” as stipulating the duties we owe to each other, but he further
argued that the duties of the Second Table imply the existence of
correlative rights.91 Thus, for example, the duty not to steal the
property of one’s neighbor necessarily entails the right of our
neighbor to the possession of his lawful property. Moreover,
Althusius considered that the underlying purpose of the correlative

84. Id. II.XII.6, at 405.
85. 1 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF MOSES CALLED GENESIS § 1(26)
(John King trans., 1847) (1578), https://ccel.org/ccel/c/calvin/calcom01/cache/calcom01.pdf.
86. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, III.VII.6, at 580.
87. Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity, supra note 77, at 133–34.
88. Exodus 20:13–16; Deuteronomy 5:17–20.
89. Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity, supra note 77, at 133–34.
90. For more detail, see WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 143–207.
91. JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA: AN ABRIDGED TRANSLATION OF POLITICS
METHODICALLY SET FORTH AND ILLUSTRATED WITH SACRED AND PROFANE EXAMPLES at X.6, at
80–81 (Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1995) (1603) [hereinafter
ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Carney trans.)]; JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA
ET EXEMPLIS SACRIS ET PROFANES ILLUSTRATA (1603) (Latin text version) [hereinafter ALTHUSIUS,
POLITICA (Latin text)].
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rights and duties of the Decalogue was to protect and preserve
human dignity (conservanda dignitate hominis).92 Reflecting on the
duties we owe to our neighbors, he observed:
Thus we render to him honor, authority, dignity, preeminence,
and, indeed, the right of family; nor do we, on the contrary,
despise him or hold him in contempt, the fifth precept of the
Decalogue. His life is to be defended and conserved, and his body
may not be injured, hurt, struck, or treated in any inhumane way
whatever, nor may the liberty and use of his body be diminished
or taken away, the sixth precept. His chastity is to be left intact,
free from fornication, and may not be taken away in any manner
whatever, the seventh precept. His goods and their possession, use,
and ownership are to be conserved, and they may not be injured,
diminished, or taken away, the eighth precept. His reputation and
good name are to be protected, and they may not be taken away,
injured, or reduced by insults, lies, or slander, the ninth precept.
And so one may not covet those things that belong to another,
either by deliberation or by passion, but everything our neighbor
possesses he is to use and enjoy free from the passion of our
concupiscence and perverse desire.93

Notably, in Althusius’s analysis, the ninth precept was
particularly directed to the preservation of the reputation and good
name of one’s neighbor. Elsewhere he observed that the rights
enjoyed by one’s neighbor include the following:
[F]irst, his natural life, including the liberty and safety of his own
body. The opposite of these are terror, murder, injury, wounds,
beatings, compulsion, slavery, fetters, and coercion. Secondly, the
neighbor possesses his reputation, good name, honor, and
dignity, which are called the “second self” of man. Opposed to
them are insult, ill repute, and contempt. . . . Also pertaining to
this category are the right of family, and the right of citizenship
that belongs to some. Thirdly, a man has external goods that he
uses and enjoys, opposed to which are the corruption, damage,
and impairing of his goods in any form, as well as their
plundering or robbery, and any violation of their possession or
artificial impediment to their use.94

In this discussion, dignity is something both rightly possessed
by and properly accorded to one’s neighbor, alongside his honor
92. ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Latin text), supra note 91, XVI, at 206.
93. ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Carney trans.), supra note 91, X.7, at 81.
94. Id. X.6, at 80–81.
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and reputation, and the duty to uphold the dignity of our neighbor
is indissolubly associated with the full ensemble of rights to which
he is personally entitled.
Althusius presented much of this material in the context of his
discussion of the civil order of the commonwealth. This civil order,
he said, provides the political context in which “the necessary and
convenient means for carrying on a common life of justice together
are communicated” among the members of a society.95 However,
for Althusius, the members of the commonwealth are not merely
individuals. The commonwealth is a mixed society consisting of
“many symbiotic associations and particular bodies . . . brought
together under one right.”96 These associations and bodies are
variously “private, natural, necessary, and voluntary” as well as
“public,” and they include “families, cities, and provinces.”97 The
reason for this is that, according to Althusius, human society
develops “by the definite steps and progressions of small
societies,”98 for families, cities, and provinces “existed by nature
prior to realms, and gave birth to them.”99
By Althusius’s account, our first and most fundamental
associations are the families into which we are born and within
which we are nurtured. The deep personal bonds of this “most
intense” form of society constitute “the seedbed of every other
symbiotic association.”100 It follows that husband and wife will
share the same family name, the same rank (dignitatum), the same
status, and the same condition.101 Next, and beyond the natural and
necessary bonds of families and kinship groups, the second
important category of human association are the civil and voluntary
associations that Althusius called collegia.102 He considered this
category of human sociability to be very various and extensive:
[T]here are collegia of bakers, tailors, builders, merchants, coiners
of money, as well as philosophers, theologians, government
officials, and others that every city needs for the proper
functioning of its social life. Some of these collegia are
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. X.1, at 79.
Id. IX.1, at 66.
Id.
Id. V.1, at 39.
Id. IX.1, at 66.
Id. II.14, at 28.
Id. II.12, at 28.
Id. IV.24, at 38.
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ecclesiastical and sacred, instituted for the sake of divine things;
others are secular and profane, instituted for the sake of human
things. The first are collegia of theologians and philosophers.
The second are collegia of magistrates and judges, and of various
craftsmen, merchants, and rural folk. 103

These associations, although voluntary, constitute the building
blocks of every political community. The first of the specifically
political associations, for Althusius, is the city, which he observed
is “an association formed by fixed laws and composed of many
families and collegia living in the same place.”104 Here there is again
variety and a progression from small and local to relatively larger
and more extended, in a succession of nested distinctions between
hamlets, villages, towns, and cities,105 for even the fully developed
city is conceived as an association of hamlets and villages.106 Next,
there is the province, which “contains within its territory many
villages, towns, outposts, and cities united under the communion
and administration of one right (ius).”107 And finally, there is the
“universal and major public association,” which is formed when
“many cities and provinces obligate themselves to hold, organize,
use, and defend, through their common energies and expenditures,
the right of the realm (ius regni) in the mutual communication of
things and services.”108
All of these associations, from the private and voluntary to the
public and compulsory, despite their diversity, are subject to the
same principle of symbiosis, which is an organic-like relationship
that involves “mutual communication of whatever is useful and
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life.”109
Thus: ”[c]ommunication among citizens of the same community
for the purpose of self-sufficiency and symbiosis pertains to things,
services, right, and mutual concord.”110 Nonetheless:
Concord is fostered and protected by fairness (aequabilitas)
when right, liberty, and honor are extended to each citizen
according to the order and distinction of his worth and status.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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For it behooves the citizen to live by fair and suitable right with
his neighbor, displaying neither arrogance nor servility, and thus
to will whatever is tranquil and honest in the city. Contrary to this
fairness is equality (aequalitas), by which individual citizens are
levelled among themselves . . . .111

In this complex way, Althusius considered dignitas to be
foundational to the rights of all human beings—a quality enjoyed
by all equally—and yet it was also, in another sense, a quality that
might be variously distributed within a society in proportion to the
specific roles and offices held by each member. Dignity and honor
are owed to everyone within the commonwealth, but there are also
degrees of authority, dignity, and honor distributed among citizens
in order to preserve proper order.
The term dignitas thus continued to retain much of the varied
and relative meaning it had in classical Latin, and it was therefore
used to designate what today might be called the special “honors”
that are accorded to individuals in view of their particular roles or
contributions to the good of the community. Also, importantly,
Althusius understood the concept of dignity in the context of a rich
social ontology in which not only individuals, but also families,
collegia, cities, and provinces, are the constituent members of the
political order as a whole. Those who hold office within the
commonwealth are therefore bound to exercise their powers in
accordance with their particular vocations and duties.112 The due
performance of these responsibilities (munera) are the “bonds and
nerves,” he explained, “by which so great a conjunction of diverse
bodies is held together and conserved.”113
V.

CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX DIGNITY

Russell Hittinger has drawn attention to similar themes in
contemporary Catholic social teaching, particularly in relation to
what has become known as the munus regale—the function,
mission, gift, or vocation of ruling. The munus regale, Hittinger
explains, originated in theological reflection on the offices of Christ
as prophet, priest, and king, and the recognition that all Christians

111. Id. VI.47, at 49.
112. Id. XVIII.43, at 98–99.
113. Id. XIV.1–2, at 87.
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participate in these munera by virtue of their baptism.114
All individual human beings are the recipients of manifold divine
gifts or talents which constitute their calling or vocation and they
exercise these munera in all of the diverse spheres of life, such that
even the associations themselves—families, corporations, churches,
states—are said to have munera, together with the rights (ius)
necessary in order to fulfil their distinctive callings.115 As a
consequence, human rights find their rationale in the munera and
are expressed through a plurality of social forms.116
The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century attempted to
deprive these societies—families, trade unions, religious orders,
and so on—of their legal personality and independence. Pius XI
(1922–39) responded by making clear, as Hittinger explains, that
rights are not derived from human nature “abstractly considered”
but rather flow from a human nature already bearing and
exhibiting a social ontology. Accordingly, negative rights
(immunities) are not the logical starting point of rights, but rather
exist in order to safeguard antecedent munera. The common good
thus has a “manifold organicity.”117 On this view, the role of the state
is not primarily distributive, but rather facilitative and supportive.
The state recognizes and supports an existing distribution of
munera that is already contributing to the common good in
manifold ways—through families, schools, hospitals, charities and
so forth. It is in this light that the principle of subsidiarity must be
understood.118 Every human being—as a person created in the
imago Dei—has been given a unique set of gifts and is called to a
particular vocation which is inherently relational and social.
And it is in this that human dignity consists. As Benedict XVI put it
in Caritas in Veritate, “[s]ubsidiarity respects personal dignity
by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of

114. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine, in 16
ANNALES THEOLOGICI 385, 388–89, 390, 405, 407 (2002); POPE PAUL IV, DOGMATIC
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH: LUMEN GENTIUM §§ 31, 36 (1964); CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 436, 783-86 (Liberia Editrice Vaticana ed. 1997) [hereinafter
CATECHISM]; JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI
§ 14 (1988); see also KANTOROWICZ, supra note 43, 489–91.
115. Hittinger, supra note 114, 390–91.
116. Id. at 391.
117. Id. at 393.
118. CATECHISM, supra note 114, at §§ 1883–85.
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giving something to others.”119 And as the Second Vatican Council
taught, the human dignity that is the foundation of all human
rights is a quality that reflects the social and communal nature of
human beings.120
In Dignitatis Humanae (1965), Pope Paul VI articulated the
judgement of the Vatican Council that contemporary efforts to
secure human dignity through constitutional limits on the powers
of government and protections of the rightful freedoms of persons
and associations are “greatly in accord with truth and justice.”121
The Pope emphasized, however, that this must be understood as a
“responsible freedom,” grounded on the dignity of the human
person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason
itself, and appropriate to our “social nature.”122 The encyclical
emphasized that this social nature of human beings gives rise to the
formation of several social organizations, especially religious
communities and families, alongside many other “social groups.”123
This accent on the social and especially communal orientation
of human nature is even more pronounced in Eastern Orthodox
teachings on human dignity. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic
Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights (2008) grounds
human dignity in the creation of human beings in the divine image
and the fact that the Lord Jesus Christ assumed human nature in its
fullness except for sin.124 Citing Gregory of Nyssa, the teaching of
the Church is that human beings realize their fullest dignity in
being filled with the goodness of God.125 Accordingly, while a
“morally undignified life does not ruin the God-given dignity
ontologically,” it “darkens it so much as to make it hardly
discernible.”126 This darkening of the divine image—or else its
119. BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: CARITAS IN VERITATE para. 57 (2009),
http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_
enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html. “[T]he contribution of disciplines such as metaphysics
and theology is needed if man’s transcendent dignity is to be properly understood.” Id.
para. 53 (emphasis added).
120. See PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE (1965),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_
19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
121. Id. para. 1.
122. Id. paras. 2–3.
123. Id. paras. 4–6.
124. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, BASIC TEACHING ON HUMAN DIGNITY, FREEDOM
AND RIGHTS § I.1, at 1 (2008).
125. Id. § I.3, at 1 (citing NYSSA, ON THE CREATION OF MAN, ch. XVI).
126. Id. § I.4, at 2.
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illumination—depends on the “self-determination of the free
individual,” for freedom is “one of the manifestations of God in
human nature.”127 And yet freedom of choice is not an “absolute or
ultimate value,” for it ought to be placed “at the service of human
well-being.”128 The abuse of freedom through the choice of an
immoral way of life “will ultimately destroy the very freedom of
choice as it leads the will to slavery by sin.”129 Accordingly, there
are two freedoms, both of which should be guiding principles of a
society: “Free adherence to goodness and the truth is impossible
without the freedom of choice, just as a free choice loses its value
and meaning if it is made in favour of evil.”130
This reasoning gives rise to what appears to be a point of
departure from Catholic teaching on the topic.131 While the Russian
Orthodox Church affirms that “every individual is endowed by
God with dignity and freedom,” it also insists that human rights
“cannot be superior to the values of the spiritual world.”132
A society should therefore order its life in a manner that takes into
account both human interests and divine truth; human rights
“should be harmonized with the norms of [religious] morality.”133
Even more pointedly: human rights “should not contradict love for
one’s homeland and neighbours.”134 Particular civilizations “ought
not to impose their own way of life on other civilizations under the
pretext of human rights protection,”135 and human rights “should
not be used to justify any encroachment on religious holy symbols
things, cultural values and the identity of a nation.”136 There are
diverse traditions of interpretation of human rights in particular
nations, and international human rights should respect this.137
Thus, while each individual should be protected from any forcible
imposition of religious convictions and enjoy an “autonomous
space where his conscience remains the absolute master,” this does
127. Id. § II.1, at 2.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. § II.2, at 3.
130. Id.
131. Mark L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1524–25,
1536–39, 1546–47 (2016).
132. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, supra note 124, §§ III.1–2, at 3–4.
133. Id. §§ III.2–3, at 4–5.
134. Id. § III.4, at 5.
135. Id.
136. Id. § III.5, at 5.
137. Id. § IV.1, at 6.
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not require “religious neutrality” or “indifference” to religion by
the state.138 While all citizens must be equal before the law
regardless of their religion, the Russian Orthodox Church teaches
that a society may freely determine the extent to which the state
may cooperate with various religious communities, depending on
their “traditional presence” or “contribution to the history and
culture of the country.”139
VI. MODERN DIGNITY
Many modern conceptions of human rights downplay the
social embeddedness of the human person and disassociate the
concept of human dignity from the metaphysical and teleological
context in which Christian theology and anthropology have placed
it. Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) conception of human dignity was
an important part of this development, although in some ways,
it reflected the imprint of older ideas on his thought.140 In particular,
his focus on practical reason—even if for the purpose of engaging
in a critique of it—recalls the long tradition, reflected in Gregory of
Nyssa, Leo the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas,
that human dignity is intimately associated with our rational
nature and capacity to make moral choices.141 Kant thus insisted
that it is only “in so far as it is capable of morality” that humanity
has dignity.142 Moreover, despite his far-reaching criticisms of
metaphysics generally,143 Kant developed what he was prepared to
call a “groundwork” for a metaphysics of morals.144 However, what
138. Id. § IV.3, at 6–7.
139. Id.
140. See generally Christopher J. Insole, A Thomistic Reading of Kant’s Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals: Searching for the Unconditioned, in 31(2) MODERN THEOLOGY 284 (2015).
141. To be more precise, Kant proposed a critique of pure practical reason.
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor &
Jens Timmermann trans., Cambridge University Press 2011) (1785).
142. Id. IV.435, at 99 (“[M]orality is the condition under which alone a rational being
can be an end in itself; because it is possible only by this to be a legislating member in the
kingdom of ends. Thus morality and humanity, in so far as it is capable of morality, is that
which alone has dignity.”).
143. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Muller trans.,
1922) (1781).
144. KANT, supra note 141, IV.391, at 10–11 & IV.426, at 80–81 (“[O]ne must, however
reluctantly, take a step outside, namely into metaphysics, if into a region of it that differs
from that of speculative philosophy, namely into the metaphysics of morals.”). On the
various senses in which Kant used the term, see generally DIETER SCHÖNECKER &
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he meant by metaphysics in this context was not what it had meant
in medieval philosophy. Kant was insistent that the principles of
morality are not to be derived from our knowledge of human
nature, let alone divine revelation, but are rather to be found in
“pure[ly] rational concepts” known a priori without resort to
anthropology or theology.145 This metaphysics of morality entailed
an individualization of human dignity in two correlative ways: first,
in his concept of each human being as morally “self-legislating,”146
and second, in his understanding of each human being as an “end
in itself.”147 For Kant, human freedom is “the key to the definition
of the autonomy of the will,” and this “autonomy” is “the ground
of the dignity of . . . human . . . nature.”148 For “the dignity of a
rational being” consists in its obeying “no law other than that which
at the same time it itself gives.”149
Kant’s theory should not be seen as specifically endorsing the
view that each individual is free to make up his own morality in
some radically subjective sense.150 On his account, the individual
does not have the right simply “to do as one chooses,”151 for the
categorical imperative imposes a duty that binds the rational will
to act only in a way that treats humanity—in one’s own person as
well as in the person of any other—as an end, and never as a means
to some other end.152 However, as Hans Urs von Balthasar has
observed, although Kant demanded that the other person must
always be respected, “the absoluteness of the person was anchored
simply in his ethical freedom” and, consequently, the “fundamental
interrelatedness of persons” that had been developed within
ALLEN W. WOOD, IMMANUEL KANT’S “GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS”:
A COMMENTARY (Nicholas Wood trans., 2015).
145. KANT, supra note 141, IV.410, at 48–49.
146. Id. IV.431, at 90–91.
147. Id. IV.428-9, at 84–87.
148. Id. IV.436, at 100–01 & IV.446, at 120–21.
149. Id. IV.434, at 96–97 & IV.440, at 108–09. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy,
which exists whenever the will is subjected to something outside the will, even some “good”
property of an object external to the will. In such a case, “[t]he will does not give itself the
law, but the object, by its relation to the will gives the law to it.” Id. IV.441, at 110–11.
150. SCHÖNECKER & WOOD, supra note 144, at 17–18.
151. Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY
143, 150 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
152. KANT, supra note 141, IV.429, at 86–87. Kant said that “rational beings are called
persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves.” Id. IV.428,
at 84–85. Kant also explained that they are called this because all rational beings are universal
legislators. See id. IV.438, at 104–05.

1234

1235

The Rise and Fall of Human Dignity

Christian Trinitarian theology was lost.153 It has accordingly become
increasingly common in contemporary Western societies to focus all
attention on each human person as an isolated, autonomous
individual. Such a vision was articulated, for example, by the U.S.
Supreme Court when it referred to the “right of the individual” to
make personal choices “central to personal dignity and
autonomy”—a conception of liberty which at its heart was said to
involve “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”154
Likewise, a leading judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court
adopted—under the guise of “the inherent dignity and inviolable
rights of the human person”—a conception of freedom of religion
described to be “personal” and “subjective,” and therefore
“integrally linked with an individual’s self-definition and
fulfilment” and “a function of personal autonomy and choice.”155
Aharon Barak, summarizing a line of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel, has similarly written that human dignity “extends
to all those activities in which human beings must be recognized as
free agents, developing their body and mind according their own
free will.”156 Observing, moreover, that individuals must also live
within society, he went on to characterize the social context as
involving “mutual relationships between the individual and other
individuals, and between them and the state.”157 Notably, however,
he made no mention of intermediate groups or associations
between the individual and the state. This idea that human dignity
is essentially about the realization of one’s authentic self is today
widespread in Western societies. Many lawyers, as Jeremy
Waldron has pointed out, simply assume that legal references to
“dignity” must convey this derivatively Kantian understanding of
the concept, but one in which self-authenticity has no necessary
relationship to the morality of one’s choices.158
Taken to their logical conclusions, such conceptions of
individual autonomy have four important implications for the
153. Hans Urs von Balthasar, On the Concept of Person, 13 COMMUNIO: INT’L CATHOLIC
REV. 18, 24 (1986).
154. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis in original).
155. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 576–77 (Can.).
156. Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right,
in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 151, at 368.
157. Id. at 369.
158. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 27 (2012).
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concept of human dignity. First, conceiving human rights as
abstract liberty rights tends to hollow out the concept of dignity.
Dignity comes to be seen as autonomy, meaning nothing more than
the right to exercise an array of freedoms in any manner and in
pursuit of any goals—provided this does not interfere with the
rights of others. On this view, the concept of dignity is hollowed
out because it is divested of any essential connection to duty, virtue,
or teleology, except the duty not to interfere with the rights of
others. Second, conceiving human rights as abstract equality rights
tends to flatten the concept of dignity. Dignity comes to be seen as
equality, meaning nothing more than a right to equal treatment,
without discrimination, understood in both formal and substantive
terms. On this view there can be no gradations of dignity,
no distinctions of honor, deference, or moral expectation accorded
to persons on the basis of their character, office, or role.
Third, conceiving of human rights as abstract individual rights tends
to atomize the concept of dignity. Dignity comes to be seen as
nothing more than the liberty and equality of the individual
considered in abstraction from the associations, communities, and
groups in which each individual is situated. Such groups,
associations, and relationships are merely constructs of individual
human choices. Fourth, and most radically, grounding human
rights in individual choices threatens their expansion into
expressions of individual will unlimited by the rights of others. For
when the individual will is absolutized, the end point is Friedrich
Nietzsche’s will to power—a world in which “man in himself . . .
possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties.”159
VII. POSTMODERN DIGNITY
The writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) are a fitting
place to complete a discussion of the history of human dignity, for
it is in his theory of the will to power that the very concept of the
equal dignity of all human beings is rejected as a carryover from a
medieval and even modernist past profoundly shaped by Christian
theology and philosophy. In his early and unpublished preface to a
projected book, The Greek State (1871), Nietzsche mocked all talk of
the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labour.”160 The political
economy of the Greek city states, he pointed out, depended on a
159. Nietzsche, supra note 2, at 45.
160. Id. at 38.
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multitude of slaves whose forced labor enabled a privileged class
of citizens the leisure to devote themselves to higher pursuits.
Nietzsche argued that the modern state was no different, despite its
professed belief in human dignity and the protection of universal
human rights. The Greeks, he insisted, had no need for such
“conceptual hallucinations.”161 They frankly disparaged the utter
ignominy of labor and organized their societies so that they met the
physical needs of their citizen elites. Modern societies are similarly
slavish, Nietzsche argued, but they sublimate this knowledge by
attaching themselves to such “phantoms” as the “equal rights of
all,” the “fundamental rights of man,” and the “dignity of work”162
For Nietzsche, life is a struggle for existence in which only the
strong survive. Accordingly, “the overwhelming majority must,”
he argued, “be slavishly subjected to life’s struggle,” so that the
privileged few can pursue the good life.163 “[A] rainbow of pitying
love and of peace” may have appeared “with the first radiant rise
of Christianity,” but an “insatiable craving for existence” lies in
the essence of every powerful religion.164 “[T]o the victor” he said,
“belongs the vanquished,” for “[p]ower gives the first right
and there is no right, which at bottom is not presumption,
usurpation, violence.”165 The modern state may trumpet the
“dignity of man,” but its true origin is not justice but rather
“devastated lands, destroyed cities, savaged men, consuming
hatred of peoples!”166 In truth, the state concentrates the “natural
bellum omnium contra omnes”167 of human existence into “a terrible
gathering of war-clouds,” which are discharged in less frequent but
more intense conflagrations of violence between nations, for “war
is just as much a necessity for the state as the slave is for society.”168
So far from the state being based on the universal “dignity of man,”
Nietzsche argued that everyone within this “martial society” must
be subjected to, and become instruments of, the “military genius.”169
The only “dignity” left to the individual human being lies in being
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43 (meaning the “war of all against all”).
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 45.
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made a “tool” of this genius.170 For “man in himself . . . possesses
neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties,” but is only a “wholly
determined being” serving powers greater than himself.171
It is possible to discern in Nietzsche’s man of “genius” the
Übermensch of his later writings—the creator of new values within
the moral vacuum left to modern man by the scourge of nihilism.
As Andrew Huddleston has argued, Nietzsche wrote of a particular
kind of dignity, but it was dignity reserved for the few who have
the will to power—the courage, strength, and determination to
pursue great things. Only in a very secondary sense can ordinary
people participate in a kind of derivative dignity by being
subservient instruments of the extraordinary few who are truly
worthy.172 Against the teaching of Christianity that “everyone as an
‘immortal soul’ has equal rank with everyone else,”173 Nietzsche
thus envisaged an inherently oligarchic culture in which there is a
“long ladder of an order of rank and difference in value between
man and man.”174 And Nietzsche was very clear about the
theological grounds upon which Christianity had taught the
inherent equality of all men. In his words:
At the bottom of Christianity is the rancor of the sick, instinct
directed against the healthy, against health itself. Everything that
has turned out well, everything that is proud and prankish,
beauty above all, hurts its ears and eyes. Once more I recall the
inestimable words of Paul: “The weak things of the world, the
foolish things of the world, the base and despised things of the world
hath God chosen.” This was the formula; in hoc signo the
decadence triumphed. God on the cross—are the horrible secret
thoughts behind this symbol not understood yet? All that suffers,
all that is nailed to the cross, is divine. All of us are nailed to the
cross, consequently we are divine.175

For Nietzsche, the answer was a transvaluation of values.
Henceforth, the “good” must be whatever “heightens the feeling of

170. Id.
171. Id. (internal quotations omitted)
172. See Andrew Huddleston, Consecration to Culture: Nietzsche on Slavery and Human
Dignity, 52 J. HIST. PHIL. 135, 135 (2014).
173. FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE ANTICHRIST § 43 (1895), reprinted in THE
PORTABLE NIETZCHE 569, 618 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., Penguin Books 1988).
174. FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL § 257, 201 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1966) (1886).
175. NIETZSCHE, supra note 173, § 51, at 634.
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power in man, the will to power, power itself,” while “evil” is
whatever “springs from weakness.” 176 The most harmful of all
vices, in his view, is any manifestation of “pity for all the failures
and all the weak”—that is the very essence of Christianity.177
The doctrine of the “equality of souls before God” was a
“falsehood,” and an “explosive concept” that had diverted human
life from the glorious conquests of ancient Greece and Rome.178
CONCLUSION
Nietzsche’s dark vision appears as a sudden rupture in the
narrative of human dignity sketched in this article. Nietzsche
plainly rejected what Brian Leiter has called the “egalitarian premise
of all contemporary moral and political theory—the premise, in one
form or another, of the equal worth or dignity of each person.”179
As Andrew Huddleston has put it, “Christian and Kantian worth
and dignity is something humans have equally and innately.
Nietzschean worth and dignity, by contrast, is inegalitarian and
achieved: humans do not have it equally; they must earn it, and
earn the respect it merits, by what they do.”180
On this view, Kant’s liberal account of human dignity is on a
par with the Christian view. However, this is to overestimate the
distance between Kant and Nietzsche and to mischaracterize the
difference between Kant and Christianity. As David Cartwright has
pointed out, while Kant and Nietzsche entertained different
conceptions of the human will, they both treated the autonomy of
the will as their “central ethical conception.”181 Both expressed
disdain for what they conceived to be the Christian ethic of “pity,”
describing it as an “infection.”182 Pity is pathological, they
maintained, because it undermines the autonomy of the self. And
yet, Nietzsche went much further than Kant. He rejected the
metaphysics upon which Kant continued to rely, albeit tacitly, as

176. Id. § 2, at 570.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 62, at 655.
179. BRIAN LEITER, NIETZSCHE ON MORALITY 290 (2d ed. 2015).
180. Huddleston, supra note 172, at 143.
181. David E. Cartwright, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity, 45 J.
HIST. IDEAS 83, 83 (1984).
182. FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER § 368, at 199 (Walter
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1901).
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Arthur Schopenhauer argued.183 Alasdair MacIntyre has
correspondingly observed that Kant’s theory is best understood to
be a “ghost” of an older conception of divine law and human nature
grounded in a metaphysics and teleology that is alien to the
prevailing beliefs of modernity.184 According to MacIntyre,
Nietzsche’s will to power is one of the only two genuine theoretical
alternatives confronting anyone attempting to understand the
moral condition of our contemporary culture.185 The other is an
Aristotelianism in which we “honor others . . . in virtue of
something that they are or have done to merit the honor.”186 I take
MacIntyre to have been very deliberate in his language here.
Human dignity is a basic feature of all human beings by virtue of
who they “are,” but it is also a function of what they have “done.”
As Vladimir Lossky once pointed out, our languages lack the
words and our minds lack the concepts to adequately denote or
conceive what it means to be a person.187 For there is always, as
Rowan Williams puts it, “the enormous fact of my being here,” a
person who is not only the sum of his attributes and experiences,
but also an active agent who carries those attributes and
experiences, and who responds, activates, and develops them in
deliberate ways.188 There is a real question, however, whether our
modern commitments to human dignity, expressed for example, in
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948),189 will be able
to survive the “death of God” in our cultures. In an important
dialogue with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Jurgen Habermas
candidly acknowledged that there are real questions to be asked
whether an entirely secular philosophy can produce or sustain a
commitment to human rights and human dignity.190 He pointed out
183. Cartwright, supra note 181, at 92–93 (recounting Schopenhauer’s argument that
Kant’s key moral concepts—duty, law, obligation, command, etc.—lose all meaning when
“separated from the theological hypothesis from which they came” (citing ARTHUR
SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY 55 (E.F.J. Payne trans., 1965) (1840))).
184. MacIntyre, supra note 5, at 111.
185. Id. at 110.
186. Id. at 116.
187. Lossky, supra note 27, at 120.
188. Rowan Williams, What is a Person? Reclaiming Relationality in an Uncooperative Age,
ABC RELIGION & ETHICS (June 26, 2018, 12:20 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/religion/whatis-a-person-reclaiming-relationality-in-an-uncooperative-ag/10094588.
189. Nicholas Aroney, The Social Ontology of Human Dignity, in THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY (Barry Bussey & Angus Menuge eds., 2020).
190. CARDINAL JOSEPH RATZINGER & JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DIALECTICS OF
SECULARIZATION: ON REASON AND RELIGION (Brian McNeil trans., 2006).
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that modern Western philosophy has had to recognize its own
“religious-metaphysical origins,” including the assimilation of
certain distinctively Christian ideas that have left an enduring
mark on many of the most important concepts in contemporary
political and legal thought.191 Elsewhere he also observed that
postmetaphysical thinking of the kind pioneered by Nietzsche
“cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason
which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization
of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism
founded on a naive faith in science.”192 It will therefore be necessary,
Habermas conceded, for our societies to make room for the “special
power” of religious traditions to articulate the powerful moral
intuitions that are necessary to sustain human dignity, particularly
in respect of those most vulnerable.193
From its earliest articulation, Christian reflection on human
dignity has, with Gregory of Nyssa, affirmed that the “dignity of
royalty” is a status that belongs to all human beings: the poor no
less than the rich, the weak no less than the powerful.194 Waldron is
thus correct to urge us to maintain the ancient link between dignity
and “noble rank or high office.”195 A kind of “royal dignity” is an
attribute of all human beings without distinction. As Leo the Great
taught, all human beings share equally in the “high dignity” of
being created in the image of God in “goodness and
righteousness.”196 Human dignity is most fully realized in lives that
exhibit these qualities. We fail to live to our full potential in our
fallen state, but we are raised to a double dignity through our union
with God in Christ.197 Our natural dignity needs to be conjoined,
therefore, with both knowledge and virtue. As Bernard of
191. Id. at 38, 44.
192. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING: FAITH AND REASON IN A
POST-SECULAR AGE 18 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2010).
193. Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 10 (2006). Waldron
puts it more specifically when he expresses his conviction that “[t]he foundational work that
imago Dei does for dignity is . . . indispensable for generating the sort of strong moral
constraint associated with rights.” Jeremy Waldron, The Image of God: Rights, Reason,
and Order, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 216 (John Witte Jr. &
Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010).
194. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 23, § XXI, ¶4; GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 28,
at 73–74.
195. WALDRON, supra note 158, at 30.
196. LEO I, Sermon XXIV, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, supra note 3223, at 135.
197. LEO I, Sermon LXXIII, in id. at 186; LEO I, Sermon LXXVII, in id. at 193.
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Clairvaux put it: while dignity without knowledge is practically
worthless, dignity without virtue is downright dangerous.198
Human dignity is also an inherently relational, social quality of
human beings. We are individuals, but we are persons in
communion with each other. As Johannes Althusius taught, human
dignity is realized as human beings engage in mutual
communication of everything that contributes to social life.199
And, as Russell Hittinger has explained, every human realizes their
human dignity through the exercise of their gifts in community
with others.200

198. BERNARD, supra note 45, ch. II, at 5.
199. ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Carney trans.), supra note 91, I.2, at 17.
200. Hittinger, supra note 114, at 390–91.
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